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TARGETZONES BIG AND SMALL
ABSTRACT
Underdifferent assumptions about the underlying monetary
shocks, we study target zones of various widths and the effect
they have on variables like the interest differential.
The stochastic disturbances assumed are successively a
non—zero mean random walk and a mean reverting process. The
latter is used to incorporate the "leaning against the wind"
policy (intrainarginal intervention) which is prevalent in the
EMS.
Francisco Delgado Bernard Dumas
Fuqua School of Business Department of Finance
Duke University HEC School of Management
Science Drive 78351 Jouy-en—Josas Cedex
Durham, MC 27705 FranceThis psper is an extension of earlier work. In Delgado and Dumes (1990) a
general solution technique is used to analyze different contracting
arrangements between two central banks who agree to intervene in the foreign
exchange market to maintain their currencies within certain limits. In this
study we would like to address a different issue, namely the effects on macro
variables of the widening and narrowing of the target zone, with special
emphasis on changes in the interest rate differential. The experiment of
progressivly narrowing the target zone is of interest as a representation of
the transition between a target zone arrangement and a unique currency,
assuming that a fully credible fixed exchange rate is identical to a unique
currency.
Svensson (1989) has already studied this question. lie restricted himself to
the study of a stochastic process without drift. We extend his work and
Delgado and Dumas (1990) by incorporating successively a non-zero drift and a
mean-reverting process. As Svensson suggested, it is necessary to study a
process that is not characterized by a constant mean. A mean reverting process
has this property. This type of process will be used to model the fact that in
the functioning of the EMSabout85% of the intervention is done
intramarginally.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I lays out the basic framework
for both the non-zero mean linear Brownian motion and the mean-reverting
process. The necessary assumptions will be made in this section. Section II
presents the various solutions for the exchange rate process in the Brownian
motion case. Section III studies the limiting properties of the zone when the
target zone is either very wide or very narrow; this includes the behavior of
the interest rate differential. Section IV describes the various
interpretations of the mean reverting process and presents the various
solutions for the exchange rate function. Section V establishes the limitingproperties of the mean reverting case. We conclude in Section VI,
I. THE MODEL: DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION FOR THE EXCHA1GE RATE
Thebasicequation on which most of the target zone literature is bssed is:
*
S—a-a+v+yE(dSI 'F(tfl/dt (1)
where S is the exchange rate between two currencies (the domestic currency
* **
valueof foreign exchange), m —.En(R+U)and m —Ln(R+U)aredomestic
and foreign measures of controllable money supply and v is an exogenous
*
monetaryshock. In this study m and m are deemed controllable because foreign
* *
exchangeintervention by Central Banks modifies reserves R and R ; U and U
stand for domestic credit. y is a coefficient interpreted as an interest semi-
elasticity of money demand and E(dS I (t))/dt is the conditionally expected
instantaneous change in the exchange rate; 't'(t) is the information set of
economic agents acting in the foreign exchange market.
The following assumptionsare made:
Al)Interventionin the foreign exchange market which occurs at the
boundaries of the target zone (marginal intervention) is instantaneous
and infinitesimal. Intervention which occurs within the band
(intramarginal intervention) is proportional in intensity to the
deviation from some target, so that we can model it by means of a
mean reverting process. This reflects a policy of "leaning against the
wind" 1
1Lewis (1990) models "leaning against the wind" in a different manner.
ftA2) There is full cooperation between central banks to render the
target zone completely credible. The burden of intervention is shared.
If the country whose currency is weak has run out of reserves, the
other central bank intervenes by printing money. The assumption is
made in order to avoid the problem of running out of reserves which
has been examined elsewhere [Delgado and Dumas (1990); see, by way of
contrast, their Assumption 2].
A3) Commodity prices are flexible, purchasing power parity and
uncovered interest rate parity hold. There is full capital mobility
and interventions are not sterilized.
A4) Both countries share the same money demand function with identical
parameters.
Svensson (1989) has examined limiting properties of some solutions of (1)
under the assumption that the shock v follows a zero-drift arithmetic Brownian
motion. Here we extend the analysis to Brownian motions with a non zero
constant trend and to mean-reverting processes. The constant-trend formulation
is:
dv —pdt+cdW; ILaconstant and >0 (2)
>0given.
In (2), p and a are constants and dW is the increment of a standard Wiener
process. For p >0--which,for the sake of definiteness, will be assumed --
wewill say that the domestic currency is inherently aicbecausethe trend
in fundamentals works against it. Without intervention the domestic currency
is expected to depreciate.
We also extend the analysis to the case of mean-reverting shocks which
3I
produces a variable drift:
dv —-p(v-a&dt+adz; p, a constant and >0 (3)
>0given,
where a is the long-run level of v and p is the speed with which the process
tends towards this value. In this specification a positive shock to v is
detrimental to the domestic currency in the short run but also induces s drift
which in the long run is favorable to the domestic currency. Appendix A
reminds the reader [see slso Svensson (1989), Froot and Obstfeld (l989b,
footnote 2)] that it is conceivable to interpret v either as a supply or a
demand shock. As long as v follows a constant drift process, the distinction
is immaterial. When v is mean reverting, however, more care muat be exercised;
we return to the issue in section IV.
Equation (1) is the basic equation which Krugman (1990) used to study
*
exchangerate target zones. Define the "fundamentals" X as: m -m+v. Note
that X includes controllable (reserves) and uncontrollable (domestic credit)
terms. Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
S —X+7E(dS Ic'(t))/dt. (4)
II. SOLUTIONS OF THE MODEL: THE COHSTANT-MEAN CASE
We are now ready to solve the model for the two basic assumptions about
the stochastic process followed by the "fundamentals". In the next two
sections we analyze the non-zero constant mean case and in the following ones
4the mean reverting case.
We interpret the constant-trend case [equation (2)] as one in which
intervention occurs at the margins only and is of the instantaneous variety.
The atochastic differential equation for the fundamentals can be written as
the non-regulated fundamentals plus two terms that take into account the
intervention of the central banks, dU and dL:
dX—1sdt+udW -dU+dL, (5)
with initial condition X(O) —— m+
m*0+v,
U(O) —0,L(O) —0,U and L
being two non negative non decreasing processes, and U increases only when S
— while L increases only when S —. Uand Lstandfor the cumulative
amounts of intervention done by the twocountries.Because of Assumption A2 we
do not have to specify who performs the intervention. Equation (5) indicates
that the same fixed trend drives v and the fundamentals X.
Assume that the value of the exchange rate is a twice continuously
differentiable function of X and apply It&'s lemma to calculate E(dS I
(cfl/dt explicitly. Substitution of the resulting expression into (4) yields
the basic differential equation which muat be satisfied by the exchange rate
function, irrespective of the particular government policy regarding exchange
rates:
S —K+y[pS'(X)+0.Sc2S'(X)]. (6)
This equation applies over the domain of K where no intervention takes place.
The aeneral solution of (6) is:
S(X)_X+lp+Ae0X+Be (7)
5where A and B are constants of integration which must be solved for, using the
boundary conditions implied by the exchange rate policy, a and -fi are rhe
positive and negative roots of the characteristic equation: 1 —ipq+
O.5-ya2q2. One property of the roots will prove useful later: I/o -1/fl—yp.
The free-float particular solution: Resorting to a no-bubble argument and
considering the fact that X under free float has support in (-c.o) both
exponential terms are eliminated on the grounds that they would generate
explosive paths. This implies A —B—0.Therefore, the equation for the
exchange rate is:
S—X+7p. (8)
The free-float solution, shown in Figure 1 and other figures, is a 450 line
with intercept at S —
Afixed-rate regime is, in theory, an exchange rate system in which the
government is committed to doing whatever is necessary to maintain the
exchange rate fixed. Because of the full credibility assumption, we can
identify in this study a fixed-rate regime and a one currency world.2
If we refer to Figure 1, point fl on the diagonal line represents a strict
fixed-exchange regime solution. Indeed, if the exchange rate is not expected
to change (E(dS I (t))/dt —0),Equation (4) implies:
S-X (9)
If the authorities wish to peg the exchange rate at some level S0 they must
2We show below that the fixed rate regime is also the limit of a sequence
of narrower and narrower bands.
6
Istrictly maintain the fundamentals at a level X —S0.
Tareet zone solutions: Assuming that the target zone policy has been
specified by two bounds on the exchange rate and the size of the interventions
(infinitesimal in our case), there is a unique aolution to the target zone
problem. This solution is characterized by smooth-pasting conditions at the
boundaries3.
The determination of the constants of integration A and B and the bounds
on fundamentals implied by the bounds on exchange rates is done by solving






at -fiX 0—l+aAe -flEe (12)
aX O—l+aAe -- flEe (13)
In (10)-(13), S and S ate the upper and lower limits the governments will
allow the exchange rate to reach before intervention. X and X are the implied
limits for the fundamentals. Equations (10) and (11) are just a restatement
3Flood and Carber (1989) present a model in which the policy is not
specified by infinitesimal interventions but by discrete ones. This implies
the same exchange rate function for the same bounds placed on the exchange
rate.The type of regulation implied by discrete interventions is called
impulse control.of the fact that at the boundaries of the target zone S —S(X)and S —5(X).
Equations (12) and (13) are the "smooth pasting" conditions. We solve this
system for the general case of non-zero drift in fundamentals, in which a
symmetric band placed on the exchange rate translates into an asymmetric band
placed on the fundamentals.
The study of the properties of target zones is based on the solution of the
system given by equations (lO)-(13). Since the system is linear in the
constants of integration, it is straightforward to eliminate them and obtain a
non-linear system of two equations with two unknowns X and X:
mk- mX-$X
-- -fls











INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Part of our exposition of what happens as one changes the width of the band
will refer to Figure 1. We proceed to explain it at this point. The figure is
constructed by changing the width of the band around S. This means solving
the system (14)-(l5) for different values of S and S positioned symmetrically
around S0 (—4.5in Figure 1). The two straight lines in the middle are the
450 diagonal line which contains the fixed exchange points, and the free
float. As we know, the free float is also a 450 line but translated up a
distance js.Thethick line is the locus of tangencies implied by the smooth
4pasting conditions. Points above S0 are pairs (X, S); points below S0 are
pairs (X.). Furthermore,in Figure 1 --asis clear from the basic Equation
(4) which indicates that the interest-rate differential is equal to (S -
X)/7,-.iso-interest-ratedifferential lines would also be 450lines,the
diagonal line corresponding to a zero value of the interest-rate differential,
while the free-float line corresponds to the levelof the differential.
As is clear from Figure 1, the following holds:
Statement #1:The locus of tangency points establishes a monotonic
(increasing) relationship between the positioning of the bounds on the
exchange rate and the positioning of the bounds on the fundamentals.
See Appendix B.
Statement # 1authorizesus. under the current assunmtion of infinitesimal
intervention, to define a tarset zone in terms of exchange rate bounds. The
assumption of declared bounds imposed on the exchange rate rather than on the
fundamentals is preferable because, in practice, exchange rates are directly
observable by the financial markets, while fundamentals are less easily
observable.
III.LIMITING PROPERTIES OF TARGET ZONES UNDER
CONSTANTMEAN FUNDAMENTALS
111.1Widening the band
We now study the behavior of exchange rates and interest rate differentials
for wide bands. The behavior of the interest rate differential is quite
different for wide bands from what it is for narrow ones. We show that:
Statement #2:For wide enough bands, the distance of )(fromthe diagonalline is the same asymptotically as the distance of X from the free-float
line and that both tend to a constant value.
Proof: See appendix C
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE
The asymptotic behavior of the band described by statement #2has two
implications. First, it implies that at points such as B of Figure 1 the
expected chanee in the exchanae rate (and the interest rate differential) is
close to +p +1/va,which is also l/ya. At points such as C, it is close to
-l/y$. These are also the limits of the two extreme values of the interest
rate differential occurring at the edges of the band (see Figure 2).
Figure 3 shows in greater detail an example of an exchange rate curve, an
interest-ratedifferential curve and the free float curve for a given wide
band. For values of the exchange rate close to the free float curve, the
interest rate differential is constant and equal to p.Asthe band is
widened,this flat section expands because the exchange rate is closer to the
free float over a wider range of fundamentals. Hence, interest rate
variability would tend to approach zero. This point has been emphasized by
Svensson (1989); it is obviously equally valid in the special symmetric case
and in the general case; we do not delve on it further.
111.2 Narrowing the band
Figure 1 can again help in visualizing the process of narrowing the band.
As one tightens the band around a given exchange rate value Se,, the system
convergea to the fixed-rate solution (X —S— Theinteresting aspect,
10however, is the rate at which this convergence takes place:4
Statement II 3 The relationship between the bounds on the exchange rate and
the bounds on the fundamentals is cubic.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Statement 1/3generalizes a similar result obtained by Svensson (1989) in
the zero-mean case. This result has an important policy implication. Evan a
very tiaht target zone orovides some roos for the fundamentals to move about:
the bounds on the fundamentals are two order of magnitude wider apart than the
bounds on the exchange rate! As compared to a strict fixed-rate system, in
which fundamentals would be absolutely immutable, s narrow target zone buys a
lot of temporary flexibility. Foreign exchange traders do not move the
exchange rate in response to a deviation in the fundamentals precisely
because, under the target zone intervention policy, they know that this
deviation is temporary. The anticipated reversion in the fundamentals, which
is bound to be triggered in the near future, is what keeps the current
exchange rate from reacting to the current value of the fundamentals.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
As a function of fundamentals, the interest differential, as we narrow the
band, has a smaller and smaller flat section over the range within which
fundamentals are allowed to oscillate without intervention. In Figure 4, drawn
for a given narrow band, the inrerest differential is practically a straight
line st en angle equal to -l/. Hence, as in Svensson (1989), fundamentals
volatility translates one-for-one into interest-rate volatility, provided the
4We also find below for the mean reversion case that the relationship is
cubic.
11economy is inside the band; in fact, the standard deviation of the
differential, conditional on being at a given point in the band, grows
monotonically as one narrows the band.
But, of course, as the band narrows, the supports of the probability
distributions of the fundamentals and the interest rate differential shrink
dramatically. The overall, unconditional variability of the differential
approaches zero as the band shrinks. This fact is vividly illustrated by
Figure 2 which also illustrates the rate at which convergence to zero
variability takes place. Recall that this figure shows the extreme valuem of
the differential against the extreme values of the fundamentals. The rmnge of
fluctuations of the differential drops precipitously as the band is tightened.
IV, MEAN REVEPJING FUNDAXENTALS
Inthis section we set up and solve an exchange rate systom similar to the
fixed trend fundamentals but with a crucial difference: The assumed process
for the cumulative disturbance v is mean reverting,5 as in equation (3). A
mean reverting supply disturbance is particularly interesting to study if v is
interpreted as a supply shock, as it can represent an error-correction policy
on the part of authorities. In particular, intervention on the part of Central
bmnks within the band, prior to reaching the edges, can be modelled that way.
This interpretation would fit the fact that 85% of all intervention is done
intramarginally. In the earlier constant-drift specification (Sections II and
III), it has been possible to interpret v interchangeably as a demand or as a
supply shock (see Appendix A). In the present case, we are going to
5Other researchers have used this process: Dumas (1989), Miller and
Weller (1988), Rrugman and Rotemberg (1990) and Front and Obstfeld (l989a).
12distinguish the two interpretations carefullY.
IV.l The model
Exchange rate Equation (1) remsins in force, but, in place of Equation (2).
stochastic differential Equation (3) characterizes the process followed by v.
is the long-run level of accumulated shocks and p is the speed with which
the process tends toward this value. This equation implies that the process




+m-m*.We now distinguish two interpretations of the model.
Interpretation /11:v is a demand shock. The mean reverting process for v
translates into a similar mean reverting process for X. However, while a is a
constant, the reversion point A0 for X is not immutable. U and L have the same
interpretation as before. Every time intervention is activated at the
boundaries, m -m*changes value and affects A0. A0 becomes in effect a new
state variable of the system, one, however, which changes only at the
*
boundaries.The initial condition is still X —mO-m+v
o 0 0
Interpretation2: v is a supply shock reflecting intramarginal
intervention. Here again, the mean reverting process for v translates into a
similar mean reverting process for X. The difference with interpretation #1
arises in the joint behavior of a0 and A0. We are no longer forced to consider
that A0 varies over time. If the authorities have decided to enforce, by
marginal intervention, a target zone centered on S0. it would be inconsistent
for them to let the target point of the intramarginal intervention wander away
from some preset level; they must therefore adjust a0 as m -m*changes to
keep A0 constant. This preset level is likely to be precisely A0 —S.
13Under both interptetations, the diffetential equation implied by (1) and
the proceaa for X given in (17) is:6
5(X) —X--yp(X-
A0)S'(X)+O.5-yc2S"(X) (17)
A change of variable Y —p(A0
-X)2/a2turns equation (17) into Kummer's





where M[. ;.;'Jisthe confluent hypetgeometric function (HGF); Cl and C2 are
constants of integration to be determined by boundary behavior aa in section
II.
IV.2 Solutions
The free float solution, corresponding to an absence of marginal
intervention, is given by the first term in (18), a straight line in Figures 5
and 6. Unlike the fixed trend fundamental case, this line is not fixed. Its
position (but not its slope) depends, via the variable A0 on the two money
supplies and therefore on the two Central banks' levels of assets (including
reserves)
The target zone policy implies, as before, the solution of a system of
four equations with four unknowns C1, C2, X, X, given the choice of exchange
rate bounds.
6This is, of course, after applying ItB's lemma, and assuming that 5(X)
is twice continuously differentiable.





Consider first the symmetric case, in which exchange rate bounds are placed
at an equal distance from the mean reversion point A0. Direct observation of
Equation (18) allows one to conclude that the integration constant C1 must be
equal to zero, since it is the coefficient of the only non-symmetric term. Let
50—A0, X—A0+6, X—A0 -Sands—50+c,S—S0 -c.Thevariablef
must be determined as a function of c, the distance of the bounds from S —
A0.






where t —p52/c2.Given 0 and the half width of the band (c) we can obtain C2
and 5.
Under interpretation 4 2 with A0 —S
the symmetric case is perfectly
natural. Under interpretation 4 1, however, it is very special: Even if an
exchange rate system starts in a symmetric situation, the first time one
country intervenes to maintain the exchange rate within the specified bands,
the symmetry will have been eliminated because the mean reversion point A0
15will have been shifted.
It is therefore essential to solve the non-symmetric case as well. For that
purpose we define some functions:
Y(X) —p(A0
-X)2/a2 (25)
M1(Y) —M[l/2py; 0.5 ; Y]
113(Y) —Mj(l+2py)/2p; 1.5 Y]
M2(Y) —M[(l+pi)/2pi; 1.5 ;













N]. and N2 are the last two functional forms in the solution (19); Nfl and NP2
are their first derivatives and NPP1 and NPP2 their second derivatives.
With these definitions and some algebra to eliminate the constants of
integration in the system (19)-(22) we can write a non-linear system of two












8For the samereason,the free-float locus moves whenever a country
intervenes.
16We now draw the implications of this system.
VLIMITING PROPERTIES OF TARGET ZONES
UNDER MEAN REVERTING FUNDAMENTALS
INSERTFIGURES S AND6 HERE
The set of tsrget zones of different widths is pictured as the thick line
locus in Figures 5 and 6. These figures are leid out exectly like Figure 1
but under the assumption of a variable dtift. Figure 5 depicts the
"symmetric" mean-reversion case in which the exchange rate bands ate
centered, and then widened or narrowed, around the long-run mean reversion
point for fundamentals (S —A0),while Figure 6 depicts the general case in
which the same is done around an arbitrary point.
A comparison with the constant-trend case seems worthwhile at this point.
For this purpose, one would calibrare a constant-trend analysis to match the
values of the drift at the center of the band (e.g. we pick —0in the
symmetric case). It would be found that the constant-trend locus so calibrated
is not uniformly inside or outside the mean-reversion locus. One might expect
that the market would tolerate wider bands --i.e.wider deviations in the
fundamentala --whenthe disturbance is known to have a temporary component
than when it is permanent. In fact, the mean-reversion bounds on the
fundamentals are inside the mean-reversion bounds for moderate size bands;
they are outside them, as expected, only when the band is wide enough.
For the analysis of limiting properties of target zones, the following
17(4
asymptoticvalues of the HGF will be useful:
i) For small Y we can approximate M[a;b;Y[ —1+(a/h)Y (27)
ii) For large Y we can approximate M[a;b;Y[ —[F(b)/r(a)JeYYa(l+oIyI1)(28)
V.1 Widenine the bend
The solution of (26) for any band produces a relationship which links the
positioning of the band in the fundamentals dimension to the center and width
of the band in the exchange rate dimension. Using the limiting value (28) of
this HGF, this relationship, at either end, is found to be:
-(k + A0p)/(l+p-y) S -(X+A0p-y)/(l+p) (29)
In other words:
Statement #4:The asymptotes of the (S,X) and (S,X) loci in Figures 5 and
6 coincide with the free-float line.
The policy implications of this result are markedly at variance with those
obtained for the constant-trend caae)°
i) A very wide band is approximately the same as a regime without marginal
intervention;
ii) For a very wide band, the interest-rate differential is at all times
9See Abramowitz and Stegun (1972), especially equations 13.1.2 and
13.1.4. page 504.
10Also, under imperfect credibility [as in Delgado and Dumas (1990)[, a
very wide band would require no reserves, as there would be practically no
risk of speculative attacks: Under mean reversion, reaching the edges of a
very wide band becomes a zero probability event. But thia observation falls
outside the topic of the present paper.
18practically equal to what it would be under no marginal intervention: p(A0 -
X)/(l+py).
V.2 Tiahtening the band
The study of narrow bands must be distinguished depending on whether the
band is chosen to be symmetric or not.
To study the behavior of narrow symmetric bands (S —S+ c,—S
-c;X
—S+ 6,—S+ 6), we can proceed to linearize the system (l9)-(22) using
the expansion (27) of the HCF. This will give us a system of two equation with
two unknowns. Solving for the constant of integration C2 from (24) and
replacing it in (23) yielda the following equation which links the distance 6
of the limits on fundamentals with the width c of the band.
3 2
6 6 ÷ 6 (1 + )/(3a y)
(30) —
1+ py




Statement 1/ 5: In the case of narrow symmetric bands, the relationship
between the bounds on fundamentals and the bounds on the exchange rate is
cubic, as in the case of constant drift.
The fundamentals deviation S is of order id1"3 (witness the flat section of
the double-sided locus in Figure 5 near point FX). The fundamentals, here
again, have a lot of room to move about.
19A comparison of Figures 5 and 6 around point FX provides a hint that this





-fl, thefull system (26) is






















where NPP1 (resp. NPP2) is the derivative of NPl (NP2) with respect to X.
Replacing in (26) we can solve for & and 6 and obtain:
—&—2c(].+p).
or: c —6/2(1÷ (32)
This result is to be compared to equation (31) which was cubic in 6.
Stetement /fr6:As soon as the band is not exactly centered on the reversion
point, the relationship between the bounds on fundamentals and the bounds
on the exchange rate is linear.
We loose the policy implication which said that fundamentals have room to
move about even when the exchange rate band is narrow.
20VI. CONCLUSION
This psper hss illustrated the tradeoffs policy makers would face when
choosing the width of a band, or when converging to an extremely narrow band
in order to shift to a unique currency. These tradeoffs concern the degree of
exchange- rate, interest-rate and fundamentals variability. They depend on the
assumed process (constant drift or mean reversion) for the disturbances which
affect money demand and/or supply.
They also depend on the type of coordination which would take place in case
of foreign exchange crisis. In this last respect, we have been careful to make
Assumption 2 so as to avoid altogether the problem of speculative attacks and
needed reserves. We have assumed that central banks credibly and
unconditionally intervene so as prevent speculative attacks. Indefinite
intervention is possible if the central bank of the currently strong currency
supports the other currency by printing money.
We have generalized the result of Svensson (1989) that the variability of
the exchange rate is translated into variability in the interest rate
differential.
We have also found that the degree of fundamentals variability which would
be tolerated by the market when a target zone is extremely narrow is very
large (a difference of two orders cf magnitude) in the case of a constant
drift disturbance and in the case of mean reversion with a band exactly




It is conceivable to interpret v either as a supply or a demand shock.
Consider the following two-country log-linear monetary exchange rate model
which has been extensively used in recent work (see for example Delgedo and





-* ** * *
m-p —*y +12 (A4)
i —i*+E(dSI '(tfl/dt +13
(AS)
All starred variables are the foreign variables corresponding to the non-
starred domestic variables. 21 being a multiplicative shock which affects (D +
R)and is assumed to follow a geometric Erownian motion process, z is the log
of m is the total money supply that can be broken down into two
components, m the controllable money supply, and 11 the uncontrollable
component. The right-hand sides of equations (A3) and (A4) are money demands;
12 and 4aremoney demand shocks. p is the price level. y is domestic output.
i is the domestic interest rate.
E is the expectations operator. '(t)isthe information set used by
In the classic speculative attack literature [Rrugman (1979) and Flood
and Carber (1983); see also Dornbusch (1984) and Claessens (l98(A3)], shoc4
came from growth in domestic credit. In our formulation, the terms and
are shocks applied to the sumofR end D, not to D.
22(1989a, b) put it, all information regarding not only the evolution of the
variables in the system (Al)-(A5), but the implicit as well as explicit
If
governmentpolicies regarding exchange rate regimes in particular and monetary
policy in general. Of impottance for our purposes is the market perception
that once the central bank whose currency is weak runs out of reseves, the
other central bank will continue intervention to support the weak currency.
Subtracting (A3) from (A4) and replacing (Al), (A2) and (A3) we can obtain




shock. Given that v includes terms in and it can be interpreted as
either a demand or a supply shock to money.
23APPENDIX B
MONOTONICRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE BAND ON FUNDAMENTALS AND THE BAND ON THE EXCHANGE RATE
For simplicitylet's define the following functions:
- aX-fiXaX-fiX (a-fi)X
NF(X,X) —-fie -oe +(a+fi)e (El)
- oX-fiX oX-fiX (a-fi)X




F(X,A;S,) —- X+S- + NF(X,X)/DF(X,A)—0 (84)
C(XX;S,S) —- X+S-- + NG(X,X)/DF(X,X)—0 (BE)
Using the implicit function theorem for F(.) —0and G(.) —0we can
obtain the two derivatives aX/a and whichwe are looking for.







24we can determine the signs of the following expressions
F F
sl x2
OX/aS — / Ja 0 (312)
C C
sl x2










Replacing all definitions in (512) and (513), and remembering that 1/a -
1/fl—-yp,we obtain the signs of the partial derivatives. Q.E.D.
25APPENDIX C
ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR POR WIDE BANDS
UNDER CONSTANT DREFT
Letus call S the joint asymptotic value of the distance of it from the
diagonal line and of the distance offrom the free-float line; let us also
call 2 the width of the exchange rate band, S —S+cand S —S
-r.We
have:
it— So+ C+ S
--yp-5 and
X —X-2(c+5)-
Tostudy the behavior of wide bands we can substitute these relationships
into (14), simplify, and neglect terms that approach zero as we make 5, c -.
Weobtain a simple relstionshipH2
S—c --yp+l/a=c+l/ (Cl)
Q.E.D.
12Svensson obtained a similar relationship for the special case of zero
drift (ji— 0)in which the two roots are of equal magnitude: m The
distance from the free-float (confounded in his case with the 45 line) was
1/a —-1/fl.
26APPENDIX D
CUBIC RELATIONSHIP FOR NARROW BANDS BETWEEN
THE BAND ON FUNDAMENTALS AND THE BAND ON THE EXCHANGE RATE
UNDER CONSTANT DRIFT
Toobtain the relationship between the widths of the bands for small widths we
are going to use a linear approximation to the exponential function:
1 +Ax+(Ax)2/2!+(Ax)3/3!+... (Dl)
The expansion is carried out as far as is needed. Additional terms are
added if the prior order terms vanish or lead to an identity.
We proceed with the linearization around S. The four variables with












27+ + -(a-I-)e° +
_________________________________________ (D7) a+ -(a6+6) e — )
Thelast two equations can also be written in matrix form as
— — —lii
-11 a 1iF 1 1 + 8 le e I1/a 0 Ie e
—
I—1— Ii II i (08)
HL -i Fe
I ij [o l/jLeej[ij





( Abramowitz, Milton and Irene A. Stegun editors, Handbook of Mathematical
Functions, New York: Dover, 1972
Claessens, Constantijn, "Balance of Payments Crises," Unpublished
Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. 1986
Delgado, Francisco and Bernard Dumas, "Monetary Contracting Between Central
Banks and the Design of Sustainable Exchange-Rate Zones," Working Paper No.
3440, NBER. September 1990.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, "Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes," Working Paper, M.I.T.
September 1984.
Dumas, Bernard, "Hysteresis in Capital Formation," Wharton School working
paper, July 1988, revised as: "Perishable Investment and Hysteresis in
Capital Formation," Working Paper NO, 2930, NBER. April 1989.
Flood, Robert P. and Peter M. Carber, "A model of Stochastic Process
Switching," Econometrica Vol. 5, Number 3, May 1983, pp 537-552.
Flood, Robert P. and Peter M. Carber, "The linkage Between Speculative Attack
and Target Zone Models of Exchange Rate," Working Paper NO. 2918, NBER. April
1989.
Froot, Kenneth A. and Maurice Obsfeld, "Stochastic Process Switching: Some
Simple Solutions," Working Paper NO. 2998, NBER. June 1989, Econometrica
forthcoming.
Froot, Kenneth A. and Maurice Obsfeld, "Exchange-Rate Dynamics under
Stochastic Regime Shifts: A Unified Approach," Mimeo IMF, June 1989.
Krugman, Paul, "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crisis," Journal of Money
Credit and Bsnkina, Vol. 11 NO. 3, August 1979, pp 311-325.
Krugman, Paul, "Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1990.
Krugman, Paul and Julio Rotemberg, "Target Zones With Limited Reserves," Mimeo
M.I.T. August 1989, revised August 1990, this volume.
Lewis, Karen, "Occasional Interventions to Target Rates with a Foreign
Exchange Application," working paper, New York University, 1990.
Miller, M. and P. Weller, "Target Zones, Currency Options and Monetary
Policy," Mimeo 1988, University of Warwick.
Svensson, tars E. 0. ,"TargetZones and Interest Rate Variability: Where does
the Variability Go, and Is a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime The Limit of a Narrow
Target Zone," Mimeo, Institute for International Economic Studies, University
of Stockholm. August 1989.
29Legends for figures
Figure 1: Tsrget zones of different widths
The figure is constructed by changing the width of the band around S —4.5.
This means solving the system (14)-(l5) for different values of S and S
positioned symmetrically around S0. The two straight lines in the middle are
the 450 diagonal line which contains the fixed exchange points, and the free
float. The thick line is the locus of tangencies implied by the smooth
pasting conditions. Points above S are pairs (X,); points below S are
pairs (X, s.).Numericalvalues of parameters are: 2 —0.25,p —0.5and y —
0.5.Units on the two axes are not the same.
Figure 2: Extreme values of interest rate differential
The figure is constructed by changing the width of the exchange rate band
symmetrically around S —4.5.Points above o have abscissae equal to iand
ordinates equal to the interest rate differential (assumed equal to the
conditionally expected exchange rate change) reached when X —X.Points below
have abscissae equal to Xandordinates equal to the interest rate
differential (assumed equal to the conditionally expected exchange rate
change) reached when X —. Numericalvalues of parameters are: 2 —0.25,p —
0.5and 7 —0.5.
Figure 3: Exchange rate and interest rate differential
When the band is wide as in the case of this figure (— 1.999, —7.001),
the exchange-rate curve follows the free-float line and the interest-rate
curve is flat over most of the range of allowed variations. Numerical values
of parameters are: a —0.25,p —0.5and y —0.5.
30
)Figure 4: Exchange rate and interest rate differential
When the band is narrow as in the case of this figure (— 4.4999, —
4.5001),the exchange-rate curve is S-shaped and is situated far from the
free-float line. The interest-rate curve is practically a straigtht line
reflectingthe imminent intervention. Numerical values of parameters are:
0.25, p —05and y—0.5.
Figure 5:Targetzones of different widths: mean reverting case; symmetric
solutionwith reversion point A0 —7.8.
The figure is constructed by changing the width of the band around —
A0
—
7.8.This means solving the system (26) for different values of S and S
posicioned symmetrically around S0 —A0.The two straight lines in the middle
arethe450 diagonal line which contains the fixed exchange points, and the
freefloat which is not at a450 incline in this case. The thin curve is an
example of an exchange rate curve. The thick line is the locus of tangencies
implied by the smooth pasting conditions. Points above oarepairs (X, 5);
points below oarepairs (,). Observethe flatness of the locus around
7.8. Numerical values of parameters are: p— 0.5,a2— 0.2,A0 —7.8and -y —
0.5.Units on the two axes are not the same.
Figure 6: Target zones of different widths: mean reverting, non-symmetric
csse.
The figure is similar to Figure 5. While the reversion point A0 is still equal
to 4.8, the center of the exchange rate band is now at o— 9.The free-float
line and the 450 line would intersect at 7.8. The thin curve is an example of
an exchange rate curve. The thick line is the locus of tangencies implied by
the smooth pasting conditions. Observe that the locus is not flat around the
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